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ABSTRACT
Many articles have been written on the Armenian Genocide, both in the context of
how to obtain Turkish recognition and how to obtain monetary relief in the courts of
the United States. This Article summarizes the issues with the Movsesian III holding
with regards to lack of precedent and the Ninth Circuit’s failure to follow the
Supreme Court’s trend of limiting preemption. This Article then analyzes related
decisions from four other circuits, demonstrating a clear circuit split on judicial
understanding of the 5-4 Supreme Court ruling in Garamendi. This Article provides
a roadmap to a friendly forum for victims of the Armenian Genocide, or victims of
any other similar foreign tragedy, who seek redress in the American judicial system.
By focusing their efforts on litigating and passing legislation in these friendly
circuits, individuals seeking justice may realize better results than the victims and
plaintiffs in the Movsesian line of cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION: TWO GENOCIDES, TWO RESULTS

M

uch has been written about the Holocaust-era litigation.1 The
idea that foreign governments and business entities could be
held accountable for their criminal actions perpetrated overseas was
itself a novel one.2 Furthermore, the time elapsed from the crimes
committed to the time of the litigation posed a significant problem.3
Overall, the Holocaust-era litigation has been extremely successful in
both a monetary sense as well as from a public relations standpoint.4
The German government and German companies were forced to
acknowledge and deal with the severe repercussions of their actions.5
They were also compelled to pay significant sums of money in
restitution and remuneration.6 For the Armenian descendants of the
World War I era Armenian Genocide victims, the Holocaust era
victories posed a wonderful working model of how to finally gain

1

2
3

4

5
6

See, e.g., Michael J. Bazyler, From “Lamentation and Liturgy to Litigation”:
The Holocaust-Era Restitution Movement as a Model for Bringing Armenian
Genocide-Era Restitution Suits in American Courts, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 245, 245
(2011).
Id. at 247-48.
See id. at 249; see also Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623
F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining how “[o]n this record, given the passage of
time, the validity of the transfer ‘is not clear-cut.’”); see also Jennifer Anglim
Kreder, The New Battleground of Museum Ethics and Holocaust-Era Claims:
Technicalities Trumping Justice or Responsible Stewardship for the Public
Trust?, 88 OR. L. REV. 37, 49-50 (2009) (explaining how sorting the legitimate
transaction from the illegitimate sixty or seventy years later can be extremely
difficult: “Much art was Aryanized, or subjected to forced sales for prices
significantly below market value (if any value ever actually materialized for the
seller), and some art was sold at infamous ‘Jew auctions,’ which are now
universally recognized as illegal. But some sales before April 26, 1938, were
legitimate and for fair market value or close thereto. Some people were able to
voluntarily sell art on the open market, albeit not much modern art after Hitler
declared it ‘degenerate’. Additionally, because so many Jews were compelled to
forfeit ‘flight asset[s]’ to pay for their passage out of the Reich, the European art
market reflected depressed prices.”).
See Bazyler, supra note 1, at 248-49; see also Gross v. German Found. Indus.
Initiative, 456 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2006).
See Bazyler, supra note 1, at 248-49.
See Vartges Saroyan, A Lesson from the Holocaust Restitution Movement for
Armenians: Generate Momentum to Secure Restitution, 13 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 285, 286 (2011).
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some long overdue compensation for the crimes committed against
them.7
There remains one important difference between these similar and
often compared genocides. While Germany and the German nationals
were openly apologetic for their crimes, Turkey adopted a shell of
complete and utter denial.8 Much has been written about the audacity
and perhaps sheer genius of Turkey’s tactic of wholly rejecting
responsibility for the genocide of over one million Armenian men,
women, and children.9 In fact, Turkey has actively endeavored to
uproot this genocide from its national consciousness by essentially
rewriting history in its educational system and international image.10
Countries that openly acknowledge and dare to condemn the Armenian
Genocide can expect fierce diplomatic retaliations from Turkey.11
7

8

9
10

11

See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sarig Armenian & David McClure, Stoney Road Out of
Eden: The Struggle to Recover Insurance for Armenian Genocide Deaths and Its
Implications for the Future of State Authority, Contract Rights, and Human
Rights, 18 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 41-42 (2012) (detailing both the history
of the Armenian Genocide as well as the attempted litigation); see also Stan
Goldman, Is It Nobody’s Business but the Turks’?: Recognizing Genocide, 16
TOURO INT’L L. REV. 25, 25 (2013); see also H.R. Res. 596, 106th Cong. (2000)
(“The Armenian Genocide was conceived and carried out by the Ottoman
Empire from 1915 to 1923, resulting in the deportation of nearly 2,000,000
Armenians, of whom 1,500,000 men, women, and children were killed, 500,000
survivors were expelled from their homes, and which succeeded in the
elimination of the over 2,500-year presence of Armenians in their historic
homeland.”).
See Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1103 (C.D. Cal.
2013); see also Tim Arango, A Century After Armenian Genocide, Turkey’s
Denial
Only
Deepens,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Apr.
16,
2015)
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/world/europe/turkeys-century-of-denialabout-an-armenian-genocide.html [https://perma.cc/LCN7-S9TP].
See Saroyan, supra note 6, at 298.
See generally Richard G. Hovannisian, Denial of the Armenian Genocide in
Comparison with Holocaust Denial, in REMEMBRANCE AND DENIAL: THE CASE
OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 201, 201-05 (1999).
See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir.
2012) [hereinafter Movsesian III] (explaining how California’s “insurance” law
affects foreign policy, and is thus preempted: “The passage of nearly a century
since the events in question has not extinguished the potential effect of section
354.4 on foreign affairs. On the contrary, Turkey expresses great concern over
the issue, which continues to be a hotly contested matter of foreign policy
around the world. See, e.g., Turkey retaliates over French ‘genocide’ bill, [sic]
BBC, Dec. 22, 2011 (reporting that the Turkish prime minister announced
measures against France after the French National Assembly passed a bill
criminalizing denial of the ‘Armenian Genocide’); Peter Baker, Obama Marks
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The Turkish denial of what is widely considered fact is not only
insulting, but has also proved to be the ruination of the ill-fated
Movsesian litigation, on which this Article focuses. While about forty
of the states have officially recognized the genocide, it has been the
long-standing executive policy to remain neutral about the issue.12 On
three occasions, the House and Senate attempted to pass concurrent
legislation officially recognizing the Armenian Genocide, and each
time their actions were thwarted by the Executive Branch.13 This longstanding policy of executive ambivalence stems from Turkey’s critical
status as an ally and its strategic location as a staging ground for
American military action abroad, especially in the Middle East.14
California sought to make an end run around the U.S. executive
indifference through legislation by enacting § 354.4, entitled
“Armenian Genocide victims; insurance policy claims; waiver of
statute of limitations.”15 This law basically suspended the statute of

12
13
14
15

Genocide Without Saying the Word, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 2010, at A10 (noting
that President Obama was careful to avoid using the word ‘genocide’ during a
commemorative speech in an attempt to ‘avoid alienating Turkey, a NATO ally,
which adamantly rejects the genocide label.’”); see also Movsesian v. Victoria
Versicherung AG, 578 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Movsesian
I] (noting how “[o]n December 4, 2008, our court received a letter from
the Turkish Ambassador via facsimile. Letter from Nabi Sensoy, the Turkish
Republic’s Ambassador to the United States, to Molly Dwyer, Clerk of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (December 4, 2008). The
letter expresses Turkey’s opposition to § 354.4, and urges the court to overturn
the California statute.”). This case came before the Ninth Circuit three times
with three different results and is referred to throughout the Article as Movsesian
I, Movsesian II, and Movsesian III for clarity.
See Movsesisan III, 670 F.3d at 1077; see also Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1055.
See Movsesisan III, 670 F.3d at 1077; see also Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1055.
See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1077; see also Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1057-58.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.4 (West 2011). The statute reads: “(a) The
following definitions govern the construction of this section:
(1) ‘Armenian Genocide victim’ means any person of Armenian or other
ancestry living in the Ottoman Empire during the period of 1915 to 1923,
inclusive, who died, was deported, or escaped to avoid persecution during that
period.
(2) ‘Insurer’ means an insurance provider doing business in the state, or whose
contacts in the state satisfy the constitutional requirements for jurisdiction, that
sold life, property, liability, health, annuities, dowry, educational, casualty, or
any other insurance covering persons or property to persons in Europe or Asia at
any time between 1875 and 1923.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any Armenian Genocide victim,
or heir or beneficiary of an Armenian Genocide victim, who resides in this state
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limitations for all claims arising from Armenian Genocide victims’
insurance litigation in the State of California.16 The specifics of the
court’s holding are discussed at length below. Briefly stated, the Ninth
Circuit found that the executive expression of displeasure in any
official U.S. recognition of the genocide was grounds for federal
preemption.17 Thus, § 354.4 was deemed unconstitutional.
This Article will take a respectful, yet highly critical look at the
Ninth Circuit holding in Movsesian III.18 This Article will analyze the
cases cited by the Ninth Circuit and explain why they do not truly
support the wide contention of federal field preemption through mere
executive expression of displeasure of a state law.19 This Article will
also show how the general direction of Supreme Court jurisprudence
has been shifting away from the wide federal field preemption
exhibited in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi20 and limiting
federal preemption in the foreign affairs arena to narrow
circumstances.21 This Article will then show how other Circuits’
decisions have reflected both a more tempered understanding of
Garamendi as well as an understanding of how the Supreme Court’s
holding in Medellin severely limits Garamendi.22
Finally, this Article will suggest a possible road forward for the
Armenian litigants in two ways. The first road has California, a state
that has consistently shown interest in the matter, redraft § 354.4,

16
17
18
19
20
21

22

and has a claim arising out of an insurance policy or policies purchased or in
effect in Europe or Asia between 1875 and 1923 from an insurer described in
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a), may bring a legal action or may continue a
pending legal action to recover on that claim in any court of competent
jurisdiction in this state, which court shall be deemed the proper forum for that
action until its completion or resolution.
(c) Any action, including any pending action brought by an Armenian Genocide
victim or the heir or beneficiary of an Armenian Genocide victim, whether a
resident or nonresident of this state, seeking benefits under the insurance
policies issued or in effect between 1875 and 1923 shall not be dismissed for
failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitation, provided the action is
filed on or before December 31, 2016.”
See id.
See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1075-77.
See generally id.; see infra Part II.
See infra Section III.A.
See Am. Ins. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396(2003).
See Medellin v. Texas, 554 U.S. 759 (2008); see also infra Sections III.B,
III.A.1; see also infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.

240

UMass Law Review

v. 13 | 234

leaving out the “offensive” term of “Armenian Genocide.” In forcing
the court to rehear this case, the Armenian litigants may be able to
force the issue to the Supreme Court while the current trend of case
law suggests a better outcome. The second road seeks to have other
states such as New York or Pennsylvania, each the home of a
significant number of Armenian Genocide descendants, draft
legislation similar to California’s § 354.4. New York is in the Second
Circuit and Pennsylvania the Third Circuit, and both have expressed a
more leveled approach to foreign affairs preemption, which may very
well translate into a more favorable legal outcome on the same set of
facts.
II. THE WINDING TAPESTRY THAT MAKES UP THE MOVSESIAN
LITIGATION
The procedural history of this case is unique in that there are three
separate rulings by the circuit court, which this Article will reference
as Movsesian I,23 Movsesian II,24 and Movsesian III.25 The same threejustices decided Movsesian I and II; however, on a petition for
rehearing that resulted in Movsesian II, Justice Nelson changed her
vote.26 Defendants were then granted their petition for an en banc
rehearing and the court reversed Movsesian II. While the holdings in
Movsesian I and Movsesian III have the same outcome, that § 354.4’s
waiving of the statute of limitations for Armenian Genocide victims
was preempted by federal policy and therefore unconstitutional, there
are significant variances in their rationales. These differences have a
profound outcome in both the soundness of the Movsesian III holding
as well as on the future of potential Armenian Genocide-related
litigation.

23

24

25

26

See generally Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian I) 578 F.3d
1052, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).
See generally Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 629 F.3d 901, 901 (9th
Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Movsesian II].
See generally Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian III) 670
F.3d 1067, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012).
See Movsesian II, 629 F.3d at 903 (“Judge Pregerson and Judge Nelson vote to
grant the petition for rehearing and Judge Thompson votes to deny the petition
for rehearing. The petition for rehearing is GRANTED. The opinion and dissent
filed on August 20, 2009, are hereby withdrawn. The opinion and dissent
attached to this order are hereby filed.”).

2018

Denial Is Not An Option, Or Is It?

241

This Section will outline and explain the three Movsesian
decisions, closely looking at all three and tracking the differences
between Movsesian I and Movsesian III. This Section will then take a
critical look specifically at the Movsesian III holding.
A. Origins of Movsesian
Movsesian I arose out of a lawsuit by descendants of victims of the
Armenian Genocide against Munich Re, the sixth largest insurance
company and the largest reinsurance company in the world.27 The
Munich Re litigation was not the first attempt by Armenian litigants it was preceded by a similar complaint against New York Life.28 In
New York Life, the litigants proceeded to engage in procedural
skirmishes on the issues of forum selection and statute of limitations.
This jousting eventually resulted in California passing § 354.4, which
expressly extended the statute of limitations for Armenian litigants
against insurance companies.29 Concurrently, the plaintiffs introduced
a public relations aspect taking on a high-profiled attorney, which
garnered significant media coverage.30
The District Court’s decision in Marootian v. New York Life Ins.
Co.31 eventually was the impetus for New York Life to settle.32 The
Court held that § 354.4 was not unconstitutional and that the forum
selection clauses were unfair and therefore not enforceable.33 On
January 28, 2004, the two sides settled for $20 million.34 Perhaps
bolstered by the success against New York Life, the plaintiffs in
Movsesian I attempted to go after the larger Munich Re. Munich Re,
however, did not yield to the social pressure and, while fully admitting
to the fact that they did have insurance policies for Armenian

27

28

29
30
31

32
33
34

See Stempel, Armenian & McClure, supra note 7, at 55 (detailing with great
specificity the history of the Movsesian litigation).
See Complaint, Marootian v. New York Life Ins. No. 99-12073-CAS-Me,
Docket # 4, (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 18, 2000).
Stempel, Armenian & McClure, supra note 7, at 56.
Id. at 52.
See Marootian v. N.Y. Life Ins., Case No. CV-99-12073 CAS (MCx), 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22274, at *53-54 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2001).
See Stempel, Armenian & McClure, supra note 7, at 64-65.
See Marootian, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22274, at 53-54.
Stempel, Armenian & McClure, supra note 7, at 54.
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Genocide victims, steadfastly claimed that the policies were timebarred and § 354.4 was preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine.35
B. Movsesian I
Munich Re refiled a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which
was partially denied. The pertinent part of the District Court holding
was that § 354.4 was not preempted by the foreign affairs doctrine.36
Munich Re then refiled an interlocutory appeal that resulted in
Movsesian I. The three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit decided on
only one issue, concluding that, “[section] 354.4 impermissibly
infringes on the Federal Government’s foreign affairs power and is
preempted.”37 This subsection will now analyze how the court reached
this decision.
Even before beginning its analysis, the court pointed out how the
legislative findings accompanying § 354.4 condemned as the
“Armenian Genocide” the violence suffered by the Armenians during
the years of 1915-1923 by the Turks.38 The court then launched into a
three-part analysis to find the statute preempted, first finding that there
is an express federal policy against the legislative recognition of an
Armenian Genocide.39 Second, the court found that § 354.4 clearly
conflicted with this express federal policy.40 Third, the court examined
the state’s interest in the litigation and decided that, on balance, the
state’s interest was superficial compared to the government’s.41
The express federal policy enunciated by the court was embodied
in an amalgam of statements and letters from three different
Presidents. The court noted how on three different occasions the
House of Representatives attempted to pass resolutions recognizing the
35

36
37
38

39
40
41

See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian I) 578 F.3d 1052,
1055 (9th Cir. 2009).
See id. at 1055.
See id.
See id. at 1054 (“In the legislative findings accompanying the statute, the
Legislature provides formal recognition to an ‘Armenian Genocide’: The
Legislature recognizes that during the period from 1915 to 1923, many persons
of Armenian ancestry residing in the historic Armenian homeland then situated
in the Ottoman Empire were victims of massacre, torture, starvation, death
marches, and exile. This period is known as the Armenian Genocide.”) (citations
omitted).
See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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Armenian Genocide and thrice the then-Executive expressed extreme
displeasure at the idea.42 House Resolution 596 was proposed in 2000,
which “called upon the President to ensure that the foreign policy of
the United States reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity
concerning issues related to human rights, ethnic cleansing, and
genocide documented in the United States record relating to the
Armenian Genocide, and for other purposes.”43 President Bill Clinton
subsequently wrote a letter to the Speaker of the House expressing
concern about the possible ramifications to Turkish-American Middle
East military cooperation.44 Moreover, Clinton urged the Speaker to
not bring the Resolution to the floor at that time.45 The second attempt,
House Resolution 193, was met with similar resistance from President
Bush in 2003, who wrote that such a resolution would only hamper the
peace process between Armenia and Turkey.46
Finally, House Resolution 106 was proposed in 2007 and the Bush
Administration renewed its opposition to such a measure.47 The
Administration expressed displeasure through letters from both the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.48 President Bush also
released a statement explaining that, while “[w]e all deeply regret the
tragic suffering of the Armenian people that began in 1915 [. . . t]his
resolution is not the right response to these historic mass killings, and
its passage would do great harm to our relations with a key ally in
NATO and in the global war on terror.”49
42

43
44

45
46
47
48
49

Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian I) 578 F.3d 1052, 1057-60
(9th Cir. 2009).
See id. at 1057.
See id. (discussing a letter from President Clinton, which explains, “[I] am
deeply concerned that consideration of H. Res. 596 at this time could have farreaching negative consequences for the United States. We have significant
interests in this troubled region of the world: containing the threat posed by
Saddam Hussein; working for peace and stability in the Middle East and Central
Asia; stabilizing the Balkans; and developing new sources of energy.
Consideration of the resolution at this sensitive time will not only negatively
affect those interests, but could undermine efforts to encourage improved
relations between Armenia and Turkey-the very goal the Resolution’s sponsors
seek to advance.”).
Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1059.
Id. at 1058-59.
Id. at 1057-58.
Id. at 1059.

244

UMass Law Review

v. 13 | 234

The court relied heavily upon American Insurance Ass’n v.
Garamendi50 to prove its contention that executive preemption can
50

See Am. Ins. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 396-97 (2003). Garamendi is a
Supreme Court holding coming out of the Ninth Circuit that applies a broad
application of express federal preemption. While the exact framework used is
discussed below and was applied differently in Movsesian I and Movsesian III,
the basic facts are as follows: “The Nazi Government of Germany confiscated
the value or proceeds of many Jewish life insurance policies issued before and
during the Second World War. After the war, even a policy that had escaped
confiscation was likely to be dishonored, whether because insurers denied its
existence or claimed it had lapsed from unpaid premiums, or because the
German Government would not provide heirs with documentation of the
policyholder’s death. These confiscations and frustrations of claims fell within
the subject of reparations, which became a principal object of Allied diplomacy
after the war. Ultimately, the western Allies placed the obligation to provide
restitution to victims of Nazi persecution on the new West German Government,
which enacted restitution laws and signed agreements with other countries for
the compensation of their nationals. Despite a payout of more than 100 billion
deutsch marks as of 2000, however, these measures left out many claimants and
certain types of claims. After German reunification, class actions for restitution
poured into United States courts against companies doing business in Germany
during the Nazi era. Protests by defendant companies and their governments
prompted the United States Government to take action to try to resolve the
matter. Negotiations at the national level produced the German Foundation
Agreement, in which Germany agreed to establish a foundation funded with 10
billion deutsch marks contributed equally by the German Government and
German companies to compensate the companies’ victims during the Nazi era.
The President agreed that whenever a German company was sued on a
Holocaust-era claim in an American court, the Government would (1) submit a
statement that it would be in this country’s foreign policy interests for the
foundation to be the exclusive forum and remedy for such claims, and (2) try to
get state and local governments to respect the foundation as the exclusive
mechanism. As for insurance claims in particular, both countries agreed that the
German Foundation would work with the International Commission on
Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC), a voluntary organization whose
mission is to negotiate with European insurers to provide information about and
settlement of unpaid insurance policies, and which has set up procedures to that
end. The German agreement has served as a model for similar agreements with
Austria and France.
Meanwhile, California began its own enquiry into the issue, prompting state
legislation designed to force payment by defaulting insurers. Among other laws,
California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA) requires
any insurer doing business in the State to disclose information about all policies
sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945 by the company or any one “related” to
it upon penalty of loss of its state business license. After HVIRA was enacted,
the State issued administrative subpoenas against several subsidiaries of
European insurance companies participating in the ICHEIC. Immediately, the
Federal Government informed California officials that HVIRA would damage
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occur even without a federal law or treaty expressly dealing with the
issue.51 The court noted how “[t]he Garamendi Court relied on similar
communications between the [Bush] Administration and state
legislative and executive officials, in addition to several executive
agreements, in finding that HVIRA [Holocaust Victim Insurance
Relief Act] was preempted.”52 The court then infused a little bit of the
famous Youngstown53 framework and explained that Congress’s
acquiescence to the Executive’s request to not legislatively recognize
the Armenian Genocide gave the Executive even more power.54
However, the main takeaway of the first prong of analysis was that
there existed an “express federal policy prohibiting legislative
recognition of an ‘Armenian Genocide,’ as embodied in the previously
mentioned statements and letters of the President and other highranking executive branch officials.”55
The second prong of the Ninth Circuit’s framework found that the
California law was in “clear conflict” with the express federal policy.56
The court looked at the legislative findings, which condemned the
Turks for the massacre, torture, and exile of the Armenian nationals
during the Armenian Genocide.57 The court specifically fixated on the
label “Armenian Genocide,” as this term remains highly offensive to

51
52
53
54
55

56
57

the ICHEIC, the only effective means to process quickly and completely unpaid
Holocaust era insurance claims, and that HVIRA would possibly derail the
German Foundation Agreement. Nevertheless, the state insurance commissioner
announced that he would enforce HVIRA to its fullest. Petitioner insurance
entities then filed this suit challenging HVIRA’s constitutionality. The District
Court issued a preliminary injunction against enforcing HVIRA and later
granted petitioners summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding, inter alia, that HVIRA did not violate the federal foreign affairs
power.” The Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit and held that
California’s HVIRA was unconstitutionally preempted by the express federal
policy on the matter. Id.
Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1059-60.
See id. at 1059.
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579(1952).
See Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1059.
See id. (discussing Medellin and limiting its holding to states having a wider
right to pass criminal statutes and thus less likely to be preempted by federal
criminal law).
Id. at 1060.
Id.
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Turkey and caused the statute to be in clear conflict with federal policy
against recognition.58
Finally, in its third prong of analysis, the Ninth Circuit weighed the
state’s interest against the federal interest.59 The court explained that
laws governing the statute of limitations are, generally speaking,
“within the state’s traditional area of competence.”60 However, the
court ultimately found California’s interest to be “superficial” because
the true goal of § 354.4 “[wa]s to provide a forum for the victims of
the ‘Armenian Genocide’ and their heirs to seek justice.”61 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that “California Code of Civil Procedure § 354.4 is
preempted because it directly conflicts with the executive branch’s
foreign policy refusing to provide official recognition to the
‘Armenian Genocide.’ Far from concerning an area of traditional state
interest, § 354.4 impinges upon the National Government’s ability to
conduct foreign affairs.”62
C. Movsesian II
Just over a year after Movsesian I was decided, a petition to rehear
was granted and the Ninth Circuit made a stunning reversal, finding
that § 354.4 was constitutional.63 The Movsesian II panel framed a
very narrow issue, “whether § 354.4 conflicts with a clear, express
federal executive policy,” and held that it did not.64 In its holding, the

58

59
60
61
62
63

64

Id. at 1060-61 (explaining how “Movsesian ridicules the idea that two words
could have such a ‘talismanic’ effect. The symbolic effect of the words,
however, is precisely the problem. The federal government has made a
conscious decision not to apply the politically charged label of ‘genocide’ to the
deaths of these Armenians during World War I. Whether or not California
agrees with this decision, it may not contradict it.”). The court found that “[t]he
Bush Administration warned that American recognition of an ‘Armenian
Genocide’ could endanger America’s alliance with Turkey.” Id. at 1061. While
Movsesian I seems to grapple with the idea that the mere words “Armenian
Genocide” would invalidate a statute, the court found some solace in a letter
from Condoleezza Rice.
Id. at 1062-63.
Id. at 1062.
Id.
Id. at 1063.
Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian II) 629 F.3d 901, 909 (9th
Cir. 2010).
See id. at 903.
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court found that there was no express federal policy restricting
legislative recognition of the Armenian Genocide.65
The Movsesian II Court, unlike Movsesian I’s three-part analysis,
did not have a clear framework, but did make two distinct points
relating to federal preemption. The first point asserted that there was
no conflict preemption because any expression by the executive
against legislative recognition of the Armenian Genocide was
counterbalanced by many statements in support of such recognition.66
The second point further asserted that there was no field preemption
because California was regulating statute of limitations on insurance
claims and not explicitly legislating foreign affairs.67
As for conflict preemption, the court held that Garamendi was
limited to executive agreements and not applicable to this case where
there was no clear expression of an executive policy.68 In Garamendi
“the [Supreme] Court found that several executive agreements,
coupled with statements from executive branch officials, constituted
an express federal policy.”69 By contrast, in Movsesian I, no such
executive agreement existed. The executive expression of policy was
merely deduced through informal letters, memoranda, and press
releases.70 This court held that these did not constitute enough of an
executive expression to create a foreign policy with preemptive
implications.71
Furthermore, the court examined how, for all the informal
executive criticism against legislative recognition as evidenced by the
executive impeding the passage of House Resolutions 193, 596, and
106, there were also numerous statements in support of recognition of
the Armenian Genocide.72 For example, “[i]n 1984, the House
similarly recognized ‘victims of genocide, especially the one and one65

66
67
68
69
70
71
72

See id. at 905. (holding that “neither the Claims Agreement nor the War Claims
Act, which resolved World War I-related claims between the United States and
Germany, has any application to life insurance policies issued to citizens of the
Ottoman Empire between 1915 and 1923.”). However, this Article is focused on
the foreign affairs preemption part of the holding.
See infra text accompanying notes 68-75.
See also infra text accompanying notes 68-75.
See Movsesian II, 629 F.3d at 906.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 906-07.
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half million people of Armenian ancestry.’”73 Additionally, the
Executive Branch has repeatedly used terms virtually indistinguishable
from “Armenian Genocide.” For example, more recently, “President
Obama publicly remembered the 1.5 million Armenians who were [ ]
massacred or marched to their death in the final days of the Ottoman
Empire. The Meds Yeghern must live on in our memories, just as it
lives on in the hearts of the Armenian people.”74 These executive
expressions counterbalance, and potentially outweigh, the various
informal executive statements against recognition of the Armenian
Genocide.75
As for field preemption, the Ninth Circuit in Movsesian II applied
a generous Garamendi standard, finding that “field preemption would
only apply if a ‘state were simply to take a position on a matter of
foreign policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state
responsibility.’”76 It held that California was well within the traditional
realm of state interests and that § 354.4 was a proper state regulation
of insurance companies.77 The court was unbothered by the fact that
Armenian Genocide victims were receiving preferential legislation,
holding that any foreign affairs implications were “at most . . .
incidental . . . particularly considering that thirty-nine other states
already officially recognize the Armenian Genocide.”78 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the “California Code of Civil Procedure
§ 354.4 is not preempted by federal law. There is no clearly
established, express federal policy forbidding state references to the
Armenian Genocide. California’s effort to regulate the insurance
industry is well within the realm of its traditional interests.”79

73
74
75

76
77
78
79

Id. (quoting H.J. Res. 247, 98th Congress (1984)).
See id. at 907 (internal punctuation and citations omitted).
See id. (“Considering the number of expressions of federal executive and
legislative support for recognition of the Armenian Genocide, and federal
inaction in the face of explicit state support for such recognition, we cannot
conclude that a clear, express federal policy forbids the state of California from
using the term ‘Armenian Genocide.’”).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 907-08.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 909.
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D. Movsesian III
On a rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit once again reversed and
held § 354.4 unconstitutional as preempted by federal law.80 While the
holdings in Movsesian I and Movsesian III both struck down § 354.4,
the reasoning behind Movsesian III involves a much broader
application of field preemption.81 It is perhaps the widest application
of such preemption and is virtually without precedent. The court’s
holding relies principally on two major field preemption cases,
Zschernig v. Miller82 and American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi.83
In American Insurance, the Supreme Court first briefly explained
how foreign affairs preemption encompasses two related, but distinct,
doctrines: conflict preemption and field preemption.84 Movsesian III
emphasized that the Supreme Court in American Insurance clarified
that even in the absence of any express federal policy, a state law may
still be preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine if it intrudes on the
field of foreign affairs without addressing a traditional state

80

81
82
83
84

See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian III) 670 F.3d 1067,
1069–70 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We hold that section 354.4 is preempted and,
accordingly, reverse the district court’s contrary ruling.”).
See infra Section II.E.
See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
See Am. Ins. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
See id. at 419 n.11 (explaining the difference between conflict and field
preemption: “If a State were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign
policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility,
field preemption might be the appropriate doctrine, whether the National
Government had acted and, if it had, without reference to the degree of any
conflict, the principle having been established that the Constitution entrusts
foreign policy exclusively to the National Government. See, e.g., Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). Where,
however, a State has acted within what Justice Harlan called its ‘traditional
competence,’ 389 U.S., at 459, 88 S.Ct. 664, but in a way that affects foreign
relations, it might make good sense to require a conflict, of a clarity or
substantiality that would vary with the strength or the traditional importance of
the state concern asserted. Whether the strength of the federal foreign policy
interest should itself be weighed is, of course, a further question. Cf. Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447
(1947) (congressional occupation of the field is not to be presumed ‘in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied’); Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507–508, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988) (‘In an
area of uniquely federal interest,’ ‘[t]he conflict with federal policy need not be
as sharp as that which must exist for ordinary pre-emption’).”).
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responsibility.85 The Movsesian III Court then created a new twopronged framework regarding field preemption analysis: (1) does the
statute concern a traditional area of state responsibility; and (2) if it
does not, then does the statute intrude on the Federal Government’s
foreign affairs power.86 While loosely based on the Supreme Court
holding in Garamendi, this is a totally new and expansive approach to
field preemption.87
In Zschernig, the Supreme Court struck down an Ohio state
probate law that provided for escheatment unless the nonresident alien
could demonstrate that the foreign country from which the alien came
granted various reciprocal rights to United States citizens.88 The Court
recognized that even without any express federal treaty, statute,
agreement, or executive order, this statute still infringed upon the
Executive’s foreign affairs power.89 The statute effectively created a
state foreign affairs policy and was therefore impermissible.90
In Zschernig, the Supreme Court noted how in applying this
probate law, the state courts were launching inquiries into foreign
states and their systems of governance.91 It emphasized this thought
further, stating “[a]s one reads the Oregon decisions, it seems that
foreign policy attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the ‘cold war,’ and
the like are the real desiderata.”92 These matters, of course, are
properly within the realm of the Federal Government and so the state
statute, while not expressly preempted by federal law, was
nevertheless preempted under field preemption.93
85
86
87
88

89
90
91
92
93

See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1072.
Id. at 1074.
See id. at 1074 (setting forth the two-prong analysis “as Garamendi suggests”).
See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 430–31 (1968). The Oregon statute in
question “provides for escheat in cases where a nonresident alien claims real or
personal property unless three requirements are satisfied:
(1) the existence of a reciprocal right of a United States citizen to take property
on the same terms as a citizen or inhabitant of the foreign country; (2) the right
of United States citizens to receive payment here of funds from estates in the
foreign country; and (3) the right of the foreign heirs to receive the proceeds of
Oregon estates ‘without confiscation.’” Id.
See id. at 432.
See id.
See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437.
See id. at 441 (explaining how the “Oregon law is not as gross an intrusion in
the federal domain as those others might be. Yet . . . it has a direct impact upon
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Garamendi further clarified this concept of field preemption. The
Supreme Court in Garamendi held unconstitutional a California state
statute, the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (“HVIRA”), which
required any insurance company doing business in California to
disclose information regarding its policies sold in Europe between
1920 and 1945.94 HVIRA was expressly preempted by multiple
executive agreements, which the Court, relying on Zschernig, held to
have preemptive power, especially in instances of clear conflict.95
The Movsesian III Court focused, admittedly, on the dicta and a
footnote of the Garamendi holding.96 In footnote eleven of
Garamendi, the Supreme Court noted that conflict and field
preemption may in fact be complementary if a “state were to take a
position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious claim to
addressing a traditional state responsibility.”97 The Movsesian III
Court further noted how “[t]he Garamendi Court in dicta rejected the
‘traditional state interests’ advanced by California in support of
HVIRA, finding instead that the real purpose of the state law was the
‘concern for the several thousand Holocaust survivors said to be living
in the state.’”98 The court made this determination even though the
state posited that the statute attempted to regulate property, a
traditional state interest.99
Building on Garamendi and Zschernig, the court in Movsesian III
enunciated a new framework of field preemption. Specifically, it
explained that field preemption, while rare, is appropriate when the
state is without a real claim addressing a traditional state interest, and
it intrudes on a clear matter of foreign policy.100 As for the first prong,
the court held that, while regulating insurance is a traditional state
interest, § 354.4 is clearly trying to provide a friendly forum for

94
95
96
97
98

99
100

foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of the central
government to deal with those problems.”).
See Am. Ins. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
Id. at 397.
See infra note 97.
See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420 n.11.
See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian III) 670 F.3d 1067,
1074 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted).
Id.
See id. (applying this new framework for field preemption as “Garamendi
suggests”). However, this Article explains why Garamendi is poor support for
this new test.
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monetary relief for Armenian Genocide victims.101 As for the second
prong, the court relied on Zschernig to support its contention that since
§ 354.4 “expresses a distinct political point of view on a specific
matter of foreign policy,” it is preempted.102 Moreover, the distinct
political point of view in Movsesian III was that California imposed
the politically charged term “genocide” into its legislation.103 The
court further explained that in applying § 354.4 “[c]ourts . . . may . . .
have to decide whether the policyholder ‘escaped to avoid
persecution,’ (citations omitted) which in turn would require a highlypoliticized inquiry into the conduct of a foreign nation.”104 The court
also noted how Turkey remains very committed to preventing the
Armenian Genocide from being formally acknowledged as such, and
so this remains a hotly contested foreign affairs issue.105 Therefore,
§ 354.4 unconstitutionally infringed on the executive’s powers to
conduct foreign affairs unimpeded by the states.106
E. Movsesian I vs. Movsesian III
The Movsesian I holding seems to be a simple application of
conflict preemption, including peripherally weighing the federal and
state interests at the conclusion of the decision. In this regard,
Movsesian I mirrors the Garamendi holding almost step for step. In a
nutshell, such a holding looks for (1) express federal policy, which
may include an incredible amount of even informal executive
communication, and (2) a state statute that is clearly conflicting. While
this is technically enough grounds for finding preemption, (3) the court
will then balance the federal interest as compared to how generally
applicable the state law is and how much it relates to a traditional state
interest.107
Finding the expression of clear federal policy was the major issue
for the court in Movsesian I. While Garamendi relied upon multiple
executive agreements to resolve American citizens’ claims against a
101

102
103
104
105
106
107

See id. at 1076 (“Thus, it is clear that the real purpose of section 354.4 is to
provide potential monetary relief and a friendly forum for those who suffered
from certain foreign events.”).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1077.
See supra Section II.B.
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foreign country, Movsesian I relied on three informal letters from the
President and members of the President’s Cabinet to create federal
law.108 The dissent in Movsesian I as well as the majority in Movsesian
II simply showed that such informal communications have never been
given preemptive effect.109 Additionally, there were numerous
informal communications pushing for a legislative recognition of the
Armenian Genocide that easily counterbalanced any federal
expressions to the contrary.110
In endeavoring to fix the obvious hole in Movsesian I, the
Movsesian III Court decided that there was no need to find an express
federal policy against legislative recognition of the Armenian
Genocide and instead substantially widened the boundaries of the
seldom-used doctrine of field preemption.111 Instead of relying on the
principal holding of Garamendi, which is rooted in conflict
preemption, the court in Movsesian III grasped at the dicta and
footnotes relating to Garamendi’s understanding of Zschernig, an
older field preemption case.112
The Movsesian III Court used Garamendi to show that § 354.4 was
not legislating a traditional state interest.113 The Movsesian III Court
also used Zschernig to show that § 354.4 intruded on the Federal
Government’s foreign affairs powers.114 As this Article will explore in
the following section, these cases simply do not support the
contentions for which the Movsesian III Court used them. There are
very clear distinctions and, furthermore, this broad understanding of
field preemption has been severely called into question by the
Supreme Court’s holding in Medellin.115

108
109

110
111

112
113
114
115

See id.
See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian II) 629 F.3d 901, 906
(9th Cir. 2010) (“Munich Re argues that these communications are sufficient to
constitute an express federal policy. They are not. The three cited executive
branch communications arguing against recognition of the Armenian Genocide
are counterbalanced, if not outweighed, by various statements from the federal
executive and legislative branches in favor of such recognition.”).
Id.
See Movsesian III, 670 F.3dat 1075 (explaining how “[f]ield preemption is a
rarely invoked doctrine”).
See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text
See supra note 101.
See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text.
See infra Section III.B.
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III. MOVSESIAN III ISSUES: AN UTTER LACK OF PRECEDENT
There are two principal issues with the Movsesian III holding, both
of which have been expressed and explored in numerous scholarly
articles. Therefore, this Article will only briefly expound on them. The
first problem is that after taking an even superficial look at Garamendi
and Zschernig, it is clear that they are very clearly distinguishable
from the facts in Movsesian.116 Even the few selected facts that were
included in the Movsesian III opinion have glaring and critical
differences from those cases. Secondly, the basic holding in Movsesian
III relies on Zschernig, which is further explained by Garamendi.
However, more recent Supreme Court cases have greatly reduced such
wide application of field preemption. Many scholars believe that
Medellin117 limits foreign affairs field preemption strictly to “executive
agreements to settle civil claims between American citizens and
foreign governments.”118 This Section will briefly explain these two
issues.
A. Zschernig and Garamendi Are Easily Distinguishable
The three authors of “Stoney Road Out of Eden: The Struggle to
Recover Insurance for Armenian Genocide Deaths and Its Implications
for the Future of State Authority, Contract Rights, and Human Rights,”
strongly criticize the Movsesian III holding.119 While they discuss how
the cited cases in Movsesian III are distinguishable from it, the
principal focus of their criticism is in the Ninth Circuit’s extreme
widening of federal preemption.120 This Section will show that from a
pure stare decisis viewpoint, the Movsesian III decision is devoid of
true support.121
116

117

118
119
120
121

See generally Michael D. Ramsey, International Wrongs, State Laws and
Presidential Policies, 32 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 19 (2010)
(distinguishing the facts of Zschernig and Garamendi from those of Movsesian
and further explaining how "Movsesian’s result is . . . inconsistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín.”). Id. at 20.
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); see also infra note 143 (explaining
the basic facts and holding in Medellin).
See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 491.
See generally Stempel, Armenian & McClure, supra note 7.
See id.
See infra Section III.A. This Article focuses primarily on Supreme Court
precedent, thus, the two Ninth Circuit cases on which the Movsesian III Court
relies will not be examined here.
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1. Garamendi
As noted above, the Movsesian III Court used Garamendi to
support the first prong of the field preemption analysis, which is that
§ 354.4 “does not concern an area of traditional state responsibility.”122
The court relied on the legislative history of § 354.4 to conclude that,
although technically a regulation on insurance, the principal aim of the
statute was to provide potential monetary relief and a friendly forum
for Armenian Genocide victims.123
However, Garamendi is simply not a field preemption case at all.
Rather, it established the widening application of conflict
preemption.124 Garamendi stands for the contention that executive
expression on foreign affairs carrying the gravity of preemption can
develop even through informal communications.125 Moreover,
Garamendi is a case where executive agreements created a preemptible executive foreign policy.126 While the Garamendi majority in
dicta and a footnote used language that could be instructive for a field
preemption analysis, Garamendi is not binding precedent for the
Movsesian III holding, which is clearly rooted in field preemption.127
Interestingly, the Movsesian III Court holding is slightly confusing
as to how much importance it gave to Garamendi as support. The
court itself noted that the support from Garamendi was not binding.128
However, once the court reached the application of the holding there
were no limiting words on the Garamendi ruling as a non-binding
precedent. The court simply wrote:
This is precisely the same purpose underlying HVIRA,
the statute held unconstitutional in Garamendi,
122

123
124
125
126

127

128

See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian III) 670 F.3d 1067,
1076 (9th Cir. 2012); see also supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
See Stempel, Armenian & McClure, supra note 7, at 60.
Id.
Id. This is precisely how the Movsesian I Court used Garamendi, albeit, in an
overly broad fashion.
See id. at 71 n.296 (explaining that Garamendi is a “conflict” preemption case
and Movsesian is a “field” preemption case and thus, Garamendi is far from
binding authority mandating the Movsesian holding.).
See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian III) 670 F.3d 1067,
1074 (9th Cir. 2012) (focusing on Van Saher, another Ninth Circuit case, and
how the proposed field preemption test supposedly extrapolated from
Garamendi should be used).
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and section 354.3, the state law held preempted in Von
Saher. As Garamendi and Von Saher make clear, that
goal, however laudable it may be, “is not an area of
‘traditional state responsibility,’ and the statute is
therefore subject to a field preemption analysis.” Von
Saher, 592 F.3d at 965; see also Garamendi (noting the
weakness of the state’s interest in vindicating the
insurance claims of Holocaust survivors). In
sum, section 354.4 does not concern an area of
traditional state responsibility.129
Ultimately, it seems that the court was appropriately relying more
on Van Saher130 for its field preemption implications than on
Garamendi.131 However, the entire buildup to this analysis seemed to
give much more weight to Garamendi, but then suddenly the court
utilized as precedent the holdings of the Ninth Circuit, rather than
those of the Supreme Court. The lack of clear Supreme Court
precedent undoubtedly weakens the Movsesian III holding.
2. Zschernig
The Movsesian III Court uses Zschernig to support the second
prong of its field preemption analysis, which is that “§ 354.4 intrudes
on the Federal Government’s foreign affairs power.”132 As explained
above, the court made two points: (1) § 354.4 expresses a distinct
political view by using the words “Armenian Genocide”; and (2)
because courts applying § 354.4 must decide if the plaintiff “escaped
to avoid persecution,” thus requiring courts to make a highlypoliticized inquiry into the conduct of a foreign nation.133
Zschernig is distinguishable and therefore clearly not binding
precedent for either of the court’s two contentions in Movsesian III.134
In Zschernig, the Supreme Court analyzed many different cases

129
130
131
132

133
134

Id. at 1076.
Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010).
See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1076; see also supra note 102 and accompanying
text.
See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text.
See generally Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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involving the application of the Oregon reciprocal intestacy statute.135
The Court noted that:
In short, it would seem that Oregon judges in
construing § 111.070 seek to ascertain whether
“rights” protected by foreign law are the same
“rights” that citizens of Oregon enjoy. If, as in the
Rogers case, the alleged foreign “right” may be
vindicated only through Communist-controlled state
agencies, then there is no “right” of the
type § 111.070 requires. The same seems to be true if
enforcement may require approval of a Fascist dictator,
as in Krachler. The statute as construed seems to make
unavoidable judicial criticism of nations established on
a more authoritarian basis than our own.136
After this robust inspection into how the Oregon courts were
construing the statute to make judgments about foreign countries, the
Court held the statute preempted due to its potential frustration of
United States federal foreign policy.137
Section 354.4 clearly does not require such an intrusive inquiry,
nor are there any California cases that the Supreme Court can point to
showing that § 354.4 would force such an inquiry. All that a California
court must determine is whether the potential plaintiff fled her country
to avoid persecution.138 This determination is far from a highlypoliticized inquiry into the functions of an existing government and
making judgments as to its democratic value. As it relates to the
Turkish government, both current and past, the analysis involves
absolutely no such judgment at all.139 The application of the statute
would be purely a factual determination relating to the plaintiff and her
personal motives for fleeing.
135

136
137
138
139

See id. at 430-31. (“[The statute] provide[d] for escheat in cases where a
nonresident alien claims real or personal property unless three requirements are
satisfied: (1) the existence of a reciprocal right of a United States citizen to take
property on the same terms as a citizen or inhabitant of the foreign country; (2)
the right of United States citizens to receive payment here of funds from estates
in the foreign country; and (3) the right of the foreign heirs to receive the
proceeds of Oregon estates ‘without confiscation.’”).
Id. at 440.
Id. at 441.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.4 (West 2011)
See Stempel, Armenian & McClure, supra note 7, at 71 n.296.
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The issue in Zschernig was not the expression of a distinct political
viewpoint as the Movsesian III Court would like to intimate.140 The
issue lay in how the Oregon courts were applying the statute and the
value-laden judgments those courts were making on then-existing
foreign governments, on the court record.141 The court in Movsesian
III focused on the dicta in Zschernig without applying its actual
holding.
B. Medellin as a Limiter
The second issue with Movsesian III is that the Supreme Court’s
holding in Medellin seems to severely cut back on the applicability of
field preemption.142 Interestingly, Movsesian I briefly distinguished
Medellin143 as applicable only in the realm of criminal law.144
However, Movsesian III completely failed to even mention Medellin,
let alone distinguish it.145 This issue is noted and discussed in an
140

141
142

143

144

145

See id. A valid argument can also be made that § 354.4 is not expressing a
distinct political point by using the words “Armenian Genocide” as because the
facts speak for themselves and the executive has made multiple statements
regarding the Genocide just not in those words.
See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433-34.
See A. Mark Weisburd, Medellin, the President’s Foreign Affairs Power and
Domestic Law, 28 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 595, 625-27 (2010).
See generally Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). Briefly stated, the facts
of Medellin are as follows. The United States entered a treaty in which any
international citizen arrested in the US be given the chance to contact that
person’s embassy or consulate. José Medellín, a Mexican national arrested,
convicted and sentenced to death for a horrific double murder in Houston. After
conviction and sentencing, Medellín objected that Texas had failed to inform
him of his rights under the treaty. The Texas court denied relief on grounds that
it was too late. After the United States rejected Mexico’s diplomatic overtures,
Mexico filed suit against the United States in the ICJ. The ICJ ruled that the case
be reexamined. Then President George W. Bush issued a memorandum directing
that state courts comply with the ICJ ruling of the treaty: Texas refused. The
case proceeded to the Supreme Court on two issues; (1) statute of limitations;
and (2) did the ICJ decision or the President’s Memorandum supersede Texas
state law. See id.
See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian I) 578 F.3d 1052,
1059 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In prior cases where the presidential policy at issue
implicated criminal law (an area traditionally left to the states to regulate), or
foreign commerce (an area delegated by the Constitution to Congress), the Court
has refused to accord the policy preemptive effect.”).
See generally Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian III) 670
F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Stempel, Armenian & McClure, supra note
7, at 75-76.
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article by Professor Michael D. Ramsey.146 While Professor Ramsey’s
criticism is on the Movsesian I decision, it is obviously applicable to
the Movsesian III holding as well.
While much of the Supreme Court’s discussion in Medellin relates
to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) ruling and the non-selfexecuting nature of treaties, the plain language of Medellin clearly
limits the wide application of field preemption.147 The United States
argued, with support presumably from Garamendi, that Texas law
must give way to the express executive foreign policy that was
expressed in the President’s memorandum.148 The Court limited
Garamendi to its facts and explained that “[t]he claims-settlement
cases involve a narrow set of circumstances: the making of executive
agreements to settle civil claims between American citizens and
foreign governments or foreign nationals.”149 This language clearly
limits the applicability of Garamendi.
While Professor Ramsey’s criticism is true regarding Movsesian I,
one could argue that because Movsesian III is rooted in field
preemption and not conflict preemption, Medellin has no applicability
at all. However, this is clearly not the case. Movsesian III’s entire
support comes from dicta in Garamendi (and Zschernig) and if the
principal holding has been so limited, then what validity could such
dicta carry?
The First Circuit, while expressing no opinion as to whether
Medellin is a limiter or not, succinctly summarized the different
opinions then in existence as follows:
We recognize that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 170
L.Ed.2d 190 (2008), may have cast doubt on the
continuing vitality of Garamendi. See, e.g., A. Mark
Weisburd, Medellín, the President’s Foreign Affairs
Power and Domestic Law, 28 Penn St. Int’l L.Rev. 595,
625
(2010) (“One
fairly
clear
consequence
of Medellín is that the very broad language used
in American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi no longer carries
weight.”
(footnote
omitted)). But
see In
re
Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A., 592 F.3d 113, 119 n. 2
146
147
148
149

See Ramsey, supra note 116, at 19.
See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 497-98, 525.
Id. at 495.
Id.
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(2d Cir.2010) (concluding that Medellín is consistent
with
a
broad
understanding
of Garamendi)150; Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung
AG, 578
F.3d
1052,
1059
(9th
Cir.
nonetheless
2009) (acknowledging Medellín151 but
applying Garamendi broadly). We express no opinion
on that issue.152
Despite the First Circuit refraining from expressing any opinion on the
matter, there is much criticism and doubt regarding the continued
viability of Garamendi.
IV. FINDING A CIRCUIT SPLIT AND FINDING A FRIENDLY FORUM
Even if Medellin is not a limiter, Garamendi simply may not mean
what the Ninth Circuit assumes it means. Garamendi may simply be a
widened application of federal express conflict preemption and not
field preemption.153 This Section will demonstrate that there are other
cases where the Supreme Court showed its willingness to limit

150

151

152

153

Interestingly, the exact words of the Second Circuit in In re Assicurazioni
Generali, S.P.A., 592 F.3d 113, 119 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010) are as follows: (“We find
nothing inconsistent with this position in the reference in Medellin v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 170 L.Ed.2d 190 (2008), to ‘cases in which [the
Supreme Court] has upheld the authority of the President to settle foreign claims
pursuant to an executive agreement.’ Id. at 1371.”).
So, while in Generali, where the plaintiffs sought the benefits of life insurance
policies bought by Holocaust victims from an Italian company, the Court easily
found Garamendi to be applicable, to the point that Medellin has supplanted or
limited Garamendi it had no effect on the Generali holding simply because even
per Medellin the executive has preemptive power with regards to settling claims
against foreign governments or foreign nationals, which was the case in
Generali since the Court found that “such law suits (suits against foreign
insurance companies for the benefits of Holocaust victims’ insurance policies)
are directly in conflict with the Government’s policy that claims should be
resolved exclusively through the ICHEIC.” Therefore, the First Circuit’s
barebones assertion that the Second Circuit has not found Medellin to be
limiting Garamendi is not strictly true.
Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian I) 578 F.3d 1052, 1059
(9th Cir. 2009) (referring to Movsesian I as Movsesian III did not make mention
of Medellin at all).
See Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 12 n.12 (1st
Cir. 2010).
See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
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Garamendi.154 Additionally, this Section will attempt to show that
there currently seems to be a circuit court split as to how far reaching
field preemption is considering Garamendi, irrespective of Medellin as
a limiter. This circuit split could have a substantial impact on future
litigation in the areas of field and conflict preemption, as well as act as
a guide for groups seeking newly enacted state legislation that could
possibly implicate a foreign policy.155
In Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,156 the Supreme Court once
again used extremely limiting language in its characterization of
Garamendi. In Whiting, an Arizona state law providing “that the
licenses of state employers that knowingly or intentionally employ
unauthorized aliens may be, and in certain circumstances must be,
suspended or revoked,” was challenged under express and implied
federal preemption.157 The government posited that the Arizona law
was impliedly preempted by a federal statute.158 The government
relied heavily on the Garamendi holding regarding implied
preemption.159
The Court easily disregarded Garamendi as precedent for implied
preemption in this instance through two short arguments. First, the
Court explained how “[a]s an initial matter, the cases on which the
Chamber relies in advancing this argument all involve uniquely federal
areas of regulation. See American Ins Assn. v. Garamendi . . .
154
155

156
157
158

159

See infra text accompanying notes 153-59.
See Evan Bernick, The Circuit Splits Are Out There—and the Court Should
Resolve
Them,
FEDERALIST
SOC’Y (Aug.
13,
2015), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/the-circuit-splits-are-outthere-and-the-court-should-resolve-them
[http://perma.cc/W4VC-44K3]
(explaining how circuit splits are generally a reason for the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari).
See generally Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting 563 U.S. 582 (2011).
Id. at 587.
See id. at 588-89. (“The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) makes it
‘unlawful for a person or other entity . . . to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee,
for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an
unauthorized alien.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A).Employers that violate that
prohibition may be subjected to federal civil and criminal sanctions. IRCA also
restricts the ability of States to combat employment of unauthorized workers;
the Act expressly preempts ‘any State or local law imposing civil or criminal
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who
employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized
aliens.’ § 1324a(h)(2).”).
Id. at 604.
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(presidential conduct of foreign policy).”160 Second, the Court
explained that “In Garamendi, a state law imposing sanctions on
insurance companies directly ‘thwart[ed] the [Federal] Government’s
policy of repose’ for insurance companies that participated in an
international program negotiated by the President.”161 This very
narrow interpretation of Garamendi harmonized with the Supreme
Court’s general trend toward limiting the implications of the
Garamendi holding.162
A. Circuit Split
Garamendi represents the first time since Zschernig that the
Supreme Court weighed in on the application of federal field
preemption.163 Garamendi itself recognized that Zschernig left
unanswered questions, but opted to circumvent these issues and focus
instead on express conflict preemption.164 Consequently, while
Garamendi carries definite implications for a field preemption
analysis, it is not a pure field preemption case.165 Furthermore, to the
extent that Garamendi widens federal preemption, it seems likely to
have been limited by Medellin and possibly Whiting.166
However, the Ninth Circuit clearly understood Garamendi to have
serious field preemption overtones and implications given that it
applied a field preemption test to Movsesian III as “Garamendi
suggests.”167 The Fifth168 and Second169 Circuits seem to have adopted
160
161
162
163

164

165

166

167
168

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
See discussion supra Section III.B.
See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian III) 670 F.3d 1067,
1073 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining how “[m]ore than three decades later [after the
Zschernig decision], in Garamendi, the Supreme Court clarified when the
application of the field preemption doctrine might be appropriate.”).
See Am. Ins. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419–20 (2003) (“It is a fair question
whether respect for the executive foreign relations power requires a categorical
choice between the contrasting theories of field and conflict preemption evident
in the Zschernig opinions, but the question requires no answer here.”).
See id. (explaining that “we think petitioners and the Government have
demonstrated a sufficiently clear conflict to require finding preemption here”)
The clear conflict resulted from three international agreements which the United
States was party to.
See discussion supra Section III.B; see also supra text accompanying notes 15359.
See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1074.
See generally Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz, 615 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2010).
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a similar interpretation of Garamendi. By contrast, the First Circuit
understood Garamendi as pertaining to express conflict preemption.170
Similarly, the Third Circuit has discussed Garamendi in a very limited
fashion.171
With so many of the federal appellate courts weighing in and so
many of them applying their understanding of Garamendi in different
ways, this issue of federal field preemption is ripe for a Supreme Court
ruling. Even assuming this split is not clear enough to require Supreme
Court review, this Article provides a roadmap for jurisdictions with a
more tempered view of field preemption, thereby providing a friendlier
forum for Armenian litigants and future similarly situated litigants.
B. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit seems to understand Garamendi as a field
preemption case, as evidenced in Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz,172
where the court discussed Garamendi in dicta. In Dunbar, the current
owner of a valuable painting sued for quiet title under Louisiana’s
prescription laws (statute of limitations).173 The painting originally
belonged to Raimund Reichel whose sole heir, Dr. Seger-Thomschitz,
alleged that the painting was confiscated from Reichel by the Nazis in
a forced sale.174 The basic facts about the ownership and chain of title
were undisputed, however, Dunbar simply claimed that true title was
acquired through acquisitive prescription.175 The District Court granted
summary judgment to Dunbar.176
On appeal, Seger-Thomschitz argued that federal common law
should replace Louisiana’s prescription law and, pertinent to the issue
at hand, that the “Terezin Declaration”177 should preempt Louisiana
169
170

171

172
173
174
175
176
177

See generally In re Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A., 592 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2010).
See generally Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 2010).
See generally Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363 (3d Cir.
2006).
See generally Dunbar, 615 F.3d 574.
See id. at 575.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 576.
See Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir.
2010) (explaining that, “The parties to the Declaration stated, in relevant part:
[W]e urge all stakeholders to ensure that their legal systems or alternative
processes, while taking into account the different legal traditions, facilitate just
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state law.178 The Court initially noted that because this argument was
initially only brought up on appeal, it would not explore this issue.179
The court then explained that “[e]ven if we were to consider
Appellant’s preemption theory, it is untenable.”180 Appellants argued
that “[t]he policy represented by the Terezin Declaration should
preempt Louisiana prescription periods because it expresses a
preference to adjudicate claims for recovery of Nazi-confiscated
artworks on their facts and merits.”181
Seger-Thomschitz principally relied on Garamendi as support that
a federal policy evidenced in executive agreements and treaties can
have preemptive effect against state law.182 The court easily
distinguished Garamendi, stating that:
California was essentially pursuing independent policy
objectives in favor of Holocaust victims. The existence
of its law limited the President’s ability to exercise his
preeminent foreign affairs authority. In this case,
Louisiana has not pursued any policy specific to
Holocaust victims or Nazi-confiscated artwork. The
state’s prescription periods apply generally to any
challenge of ownership to movable property, and are
well within the realm of traditional state
responsibility.183
The court’s characterization of Garamendi is a clear indicator that the
Fifth Circuit understood Garamendi as a field preemption case. In
explaining the Garamendi holding, the court wrote:

178
179
180
181

182
183

and fair solutions with regard to Nazi-confiscated and looted art, and to make
certain that claims to recover such art are resolved expeditiously and based on
the facts and merits of the claims and all the relevant documents submitted by all
parties. Governments should consider all relevant issues when applying various
legal provisions that may impede the restitution of art and cultural property, in
order to achieve just and fair solutions, as well as alternative dispute resolution,
where appropriate under law.”).
See Dunbar, 615 F.3d at 577.
See id.
Id. at 578.
See id. at 578-79 (“As additional support, Appellant cites statements by various
executive branch officials expressing concern that such claims were not being
adjudicated on the merits but were barred by statutes of limitations and other
defenses.”).
Id. at 578.
Id. at 579.
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Significantly, Garamendi found
preemption
while
acknowledging the absence of either an express federal
preemption clause or a direct conflict between
California and federal law. Garamendi noted, however,
that where a state has acted within “its traditional
competence, but in a way that affects foreign relations,
it might make good sense to require a conflict, of a
clarity or substantiality that would vary with the
strength or traditional importance of the state concern
asserted.”184
If the court understood Garamendi to be an express conflict
preemption case, as this Article proposes, it might have simply
distinguished Garamendi because there is no express federal policy
expressed in Dunbar. The Fifth Circuit clearly understands Garamendi
as the Ninth Circuit did: as a field preemption case where the state
ventured beyond its “traditional competence.”185
C. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit in In re Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A.,186 also
seemed to apply Garamendi as a field preemption case, however, it is
not perfectly clear on this point.187 Generali involved a direct
application of Garamendi and as such the facts are not as critical to
this analysis.. Briefly stated, plaintiffs were beneficiaries of insurance
policies sold by Generali, an Italian insurance company, to Holocaust
victims during the years of 1920-1942.188 Many similar lawsuits,
originating in different circuits, were consolidated and transferred to
the Southern District of New York.189 Relying on the Garamendi
ruling, which came down from the Supreme Court in 2003, the District
Court dismissed all these actions the following year.190 On appeal, the
Second Circuit found Garamendi to be controlling precedent and
upheld the District Court’s dismissal.191 According to the court, the
184
185
186
187
188

189
190
191

Id. at 578 (citations omitted).
Id.
See generally In re Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A., 592 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2010).
See infra text accompanying notes 192-95.
See Generali, 592 F.3d at 115-18 (regarding the background and procedural
history).
Id. at 116.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 120.

266

UMass Law Review

v. 13 | 234

claims against Generali were precisely the kinds of claims that the
United States government previously had agreed with Germany to be
handled by the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance
Claims (“ICHEIC”).192 In Garamendi, the California law merely
mandated disclosure requirements on insurance companies regarding
all policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945.193 But “although
not directly in conflict with government’s policy to encourage use of
the ICHEIC to resolve Holocaust-era insurance claims, [the California
law] nonetheless undermined the Government’s objective” and was
therefore preempted.194 In contrast, Generali was a direct lawsuit
against an insurance company for benefits owed due to actions
occurring during World War II.195 The court explained that “such law
suits are directly in conflict with the Government’s policy that claims
should be resolved exclusively through the ICHEIC.”196
The court in Generali characterized Garamendi first as a conflict
preemption case, but then, in answering the plaintiffs’ attempts to
192

193

194
195
196

See id. at 116 (providing a brief history and overview of the facts leading up to
both the Garamendi and Generali litigation: “In July 2000, the United States
announced an agreement with Germany in which the German government
agreed to enact legislation to establish a foundation that would be used to
compensate all victims who suffered at the hands of German companies during
the Nazi era. In return, the United States agreed that whenever a German
company was sued on a Holocaust-era claim in an American (state or federal)
court, the government of the United States would submit a statement of interest
to the court explaining that ‘it would be in the foreign policy interests of the
United States for the [German] Foundation to be the exclusive forum and
remedy for the resolution of all asserted claims against German companies
arising from their involvement in the National Socialist era and World War II . .
. . With respect to insurance claims, the agreement specified that the German
foundation would work with the ICHEIC to handle insurance claims. The
ICHEIC was formed in 1998 by ‘several European insurance companies, the
State of Israel, Jewish and Holocaust survivor associations, and the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners,’ to negotiate with European insurers
to provide information about unpaid policies issued to Holocaust victims
between 1920 and 1945, and to settle any claims that arose in the Holocaust era
under these policies.”) (citations omitted).
See Am. Ins.v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 397 (2003) (“[a]mong other laws,
California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA) requires
any insurer doing business in the State to disclose information about all policies
sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945 by the company or any one “related” to
it upon penalty of loss of its state business license.”).
See Generali, 592 F.3d at 118.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 118.
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distinguish Generali from Garamendi, seemed to consider Garamendi
to be a field preemption case. In introducing Garamendi, the Court
wrote that “[i]n Garamendi, the Supreme Court explained that state
law ‘must give way’ to the foreign policy of the United States, as set
by the President, where there is ‘evidence of clear conflict between the
policies adopted by the two.’”197 These words evidence an
understanding that Garamendi is rooted in conflict preemption.
The court demonstrated that while Generali is distinguishable from
Garamendi in that there was no executive agreement between the
United States and Italy, this argument is unconvincing.198 Specifically,
the court stated:
The Court in Garamendi . . . did not find that the
United States policy of encouraging resolution of
Holocaust-era insurance claims through the ICHEIC
depended on the existence of executive agreements.
Rather, the Court viewed the executive agreements as
the product of the policy. The agreements, and
statements of interest issued by the Government
pursuant to them, illustrate or express the national
position, rather than define it.199
The Second Circuit understood that express conflict preemption comes
about due to the “executive policy.”200 In Garamendi, the executive
policy was evidenced, in part, by an executive agreement.201 However,
197

198
199
200
201

See id. (“[the Garamendi] Court concluded that the ‘consistent Presidential
foreign policy has been to encourage European governments and companies to
volunteer settlement funds in preference to litigation or coercive sanctions,’ and,
in the insurance context specifically, ‘to encourage European insurers to work
with the ICHEIC to develop acceptable claim procedures.’”).
Id. at 118.
Id.
Id.
See Am. Ins. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003) (explaining that there was
clear conflict between the Federal position and that of California: “The exercise
of the federal executive authority means that state law must give way where, as
here, there is evidence of clear conflict between the policies adopted by the two.
The foregoing account of negotiations toward the three settlement agreements is
enough to illustrate that the consistent Presidential foreign policy has been to
encourage European governments and companies to volunteer settlement funds
in preference to litigation or coercive sanctions . . . . As for insurance claims in
particular, the national position, expressed unmistakably in the executive
agreements signed by the President with Germany and Austria, has been to
encourage European insurers to work with the ICHEIC to develop acceptable
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the court in Generali was clearly open to the idea that the federal
expression of executive policy may come about in other ways and still
have preemptive effect. This is the precise reasoning that was applied
by in Movsesian I.202 Thus, while the Second Circuit clearly applied
Garamendi to Generali in a conflict preemption fashion, the Generali
holding is mostly consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s Movsesian I.
D. First Circuit
The First Circuit decision in Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v.
Seger-Thomschitz203 has already been discussed in this Article for its
contention that some scholars and courts have found Medellin to be a
limiter of Garamendi.204 This Section will focus on the Museum of
Fine Arts principal holding on foreign affairs preemption. The First
Circuit seems to have clearly understood Garamendi as conflict
preemption case. Consequently, the First Circuit would very likely
come up with a different outcome than the Movsesian III Court if
presented with similar facts.
Interestingly, Museum of Fine Arts involves nearly identical facts
to the Dunbar case, as discussed above.205 In Museum of Fine Arts,
Claudia Seger-Thomschitz, the same plaintiff as in Dunbar, sought to
regain possession of a different valuable painting from the Museum of
Fine Arts in Boston, under the same theory that her ancestor had been
forced to sell the painting in dispute.206 Eventually, the Museum of
Fine Arts sued for quiet title and the District Court granted the
museum summary judgment on the grounds of statute of limitations.207
On appeal, there was the narrow issue of whether the plaintiff’s
claim was time-barred.208 The court held that the claims were timebarred, federal common law did not apply, and that there was no

202

203
204
205

206
207
208

claim procedures, including procedures governing disclosure of policy
information.”).
See discussion supra Section II.B. The Movsesian I Court greatly expanded
which federal expressions can have preemptive effect on state laws – there, it
was the mere act of the executive sending disapproving letters to Congress.
Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
Supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
Compare Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, 623 F.3d 1, with Dunbar v. SegerThomschitz, 615 F.3d (5th Cir. 2010).
Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, 623 F.3d at 2.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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foreign affairs preemption.209 Notably, in this proceeding, SegerThomschitz brought up the issue of foreign affairs preemption in her
opening brief and the First Circuit ruled definitively on this issue,
unlike in Dunbar, where the ruling on the foreign affairs issue was
essentially dicta.210 Seger-Thomschitz argued that the Massachusetts
statute of limitation laws as applied to the case conflicted with the
Federal Government’s foreign policy.211 She relied on several
international declarations signed by the Executive Branch, among
them the Terezin Declaration.212 Plaintiff argued that these
declarations evidenced a federal policy “disfavoring the application of
rigid limitations periods to claims for Nazi-looted art.”213
As in Dunbar, Seger-Thomschitz attempted to use Garamendi as
support for her claim.214 The court first characterized Garamendi as a
case where “[t]he Supreme Court held . . . that ‘state law must give
way’ when it is in ‘clear conflict’ with an ‘express federal policy’ in
the foreign affairs context.”215 The court then easily defeated this point
by distinguishing Garamendi on two points, including that “First, there
is no comparably express federal policy bearing on the issues in this
case. Second, even if there were such a policy, the Massachusetts
statute of limitations would not be in clear conflict with it.”216
Both in the court’s introduction and its application of Garamendi,
the First Circuit plainly understood Garamendi as nothing more than a
209
210

211
212
213
214
215

216

Id. at 6-13.
See id. at 11 n.11 (“The MFA contends that Seger–Thomschitz’s foreign affairs
preemption argument is forfeited because it was raised for the first time in her
reply brief. That is not correct. Seger–Thomschitz specifically argued for foreign
affairs preemption in her opening brief. She then developed that argument
further in her reply brief. There was no forfeiture.”).
Id. at 9-14.
Id. at 12.
Id at 11.
Id. at 11-12.
See id. The court also explains that, “The [Supreme] Court held that the ‘clear
conflict’ between the state statute and an “express federal policy” was sufficient
to justify preemption. Id. It added: If any doubt about the clarity of the conflict
remained, however, it would have to be resolved in the National Government’s
favor, given the weakness of the State’s interest, against the backdrop of
traditional state legislative subject matter, in regulating disclosure of European
Holocaust-era insurance policies in the manner of HVIRA.”) Id. at 12 (citations
omitted).
Id.
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wide application of express conflict preemption.217 In Museum of Fine
Arts, the First Circuit did not find any express federal policy even
though there were two declarations, a treaty and an executive
agreement, and both evinced the idea that technicalities of the law
should not govern looted property claims218 Accordingly, if the First
Circuit were to rule on the facts of Movsesian, it is likely that it would
not find conflict preemption as there is even less evidence in
Movsesian as to any express federal policy. Furthermore, the logic of
the court in Movsesian III would be unavailing for the First Circuit, as
it clearly understood Garamendi to be rooted in conflict preemption
and not field preemption.219
E. Third Circuit
Similarly, the Third Circuit in Gross v. German Found. Indus.
Initiative220 applied Garamendi in a most limited manner and seriously
confined the breadth of field preemption to areas of law and instances
where the federal government has adopted a clear and express
policy.221 This is in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in
Movsesian III, where the California insurance law was preempted
merely because the state failed to address its clear traditional state
interest, and thus intruded on a matter of foreign affairs.222 While
Gross is preeminently a case about justiciability, there are clear
implications as to how the Third Circuit understood and applied
Garamendi.223 In Gross, the dispute centered on how much interest

217
218

219
220
221

222

223

See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
See Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, 623 F.3d at 13 (“None of this language is
sufficiently clear and definite to constitute evidence of an express federal policy
against the applicability of state statutes of limitations to claims for the recovery
of lost, stolen, or confiscated art.”).
See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
See Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2006).
See id. at 381 (explaining that the Garamendi Court found preemption since
“[t]hese claims to enforce insurance policies [under the California statute] were
the claims the Foundation was set up to exclusively resolve.”).
See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian III) 670 F.3d 1067,
1077 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because California Code of Civil Procedure section
354.4 does not concern an area of traditional state responsibility and intrudes on
the field of foreign affairs entrusted exclusively to the federal government, we
hold that section 354.4 is preempted.”).
See Gross, 456 F.3d at 380-81, 388.

2018

Denial Is Not An Option, Or Is It?

271

was contemplated in the German government’s newly-created fund.224
The vast majority of the holding is a detailed analysis of the Baker v.
Carr225 factors for finding a justiciable conflict. The court in Gross
ultimately decided that there did exist a justiciable conflict and this
issue was not a political question.226 The Court reversed and remanded
to the District Court of New Jersey.227
Defendants in Gross argued that Garamendi “stands for the
proposition that the United States Executive has an ‘exclusive role in
matters relating to the Foundation and Nazi-era claims against German
nationals.’”228 The Third Circuit limited Garamendi to its facts where
the executive branch had created a clear policy by addressing the issue
in question (insurance policies) saying “[t]hese claims [of the
plaintiff’s in Garamendi] to enforce insurance policies were the claims
the Foundation was set up to exclusively resolve.”229 This is a clear
reflection of an understanding that Garamendi is a conflict preemption
case.
The Supreme Court in Baker expounded on Garamendi when
deciding on the first Baker factor: whether there is “a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department.”230 The Gross Court explained, citing to
Garamendi, that “[al]though the Executive’s powers in foreign affairs
‘do not enjoy any textual detail’ within the Constitution itself, ‘in
foreign affairs the President has a degree of independent authority to
act.’”231 However, the court then severely limited this contention to
instances where the executive has exercised its foreign affairs
powers.232
While the Third Circuit’s analysis in Gross of executive foreign
affairs power is fixed in justiciability, the idea enunciated is applicable
to foreign affairs preemption as well. The Third Circuit wrote:
224

225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232

See generally id at 367-75 (explaining that background facts in Gross are
analogous to the U. S. government’s efforts in Garamendi to try to keep all such
litigation out of American courts).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
See Gross, 456 F.3d at 388.
See id. at 394.
Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
Id. at 381.
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
See Gross, 456 F.3d at 387 (citations omitted).
See supra text accompanying note 221.
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But it is precisely the breadth of the Executive’s power
in this field that counsels against our finding that the
political question doctrine precludes our review. While
the Executive could constitutionally act to resolve the
issue of whether “interest” is owed on this “contract”
or to settle this claim through diplomacy, it has not
done so. If we were to find that any claim raising an
issue that the Executive could potentially resolve within
its constitutional “independent authority to act” in
foreign affairs to be nonjusticiable, we would risk
erroneously sweeping “every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations . . . beyond judicial
cognizance.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 211, 82 S.Ct. 691. The
mere existence of the Executive’s power to extinguish
claims made to the Judiciary for redress from foreign
entities and to resolve certain issues raised in those
claims, without an exercise of that power, does not
render those claims nonjusticiable by virtue of being
committed to a co-equal branch.233
If the Third Circuit in Gross held as the Ninth Circuit did in Movsesian
III, then what consequence would exist if these types of disputes are
justiciable? Once such claims get to court, they will be dismissed
under field preemption.234 Obviously, the Third Circuit has adopted a
more tempered understanding of field preemption in general.
V. CONCLUSION
While the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Movsesian III potentially
slammed the doors of American courts in the face of Armenian
Genocide victims, there remain options for moving forward. The
model of the Holocaust-era litigation still stands as an example of how
to hold rogue countries and their corporations accountable for past
misdeeds. The Turkish refusal to face the reality of its guilt and the
United States executive’s strategic decision to permit this denial, have
created an insurmountable obstacle for Armenian litigants. However,
233
234

See Gross, 456 F.3d at 387.
If the Movsesian III Court preempted states from passing laws which were in the
“domain” of the Executive’s foreign affairs power, it might reasonably have
held that the interest issue in Gross was not properly before the courts – as the
issue is clearly in the area of foreign affairs.
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the idea of relentless persistence and dogged determination can still be
gleaned from the Holocaust-era litigation. In fact, as long as Armenian
survivors refuse to forget, there remains the chance that at some date
justice will prevail either by Turkey officially recognizing the
Armenian Genocide or in a legal victory for monetary compensation to
survivors and their descendants.
Even if there is never another case brought by an Armenian
Genocide descendant, this Article still stands as a useful model for
future analysis. There are unfortunately numerous instances where
governments go rogue and refuse to acknowledge the facts of history
and long-lasting impact on survivors. Regrettably, when governments
neglect their duties of truth to their citizens, many private companies
take advantage by profiteering. Consequently, many innocent people
are victimized. The victims of some future genocide or state-sponsored
seizure may seek redress in the U.S. courts and this Article helps those
litigants either frame better legislation in friendlier jurisdictions or
force the Supreme Court to rule on an apparent circuit split.

